The article, written by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mojca M. Plesničar, discusses the architecture of choice as a concept that is increasingly important in legal decision-making. Although behavioral economics research has long been based primarily on the decision-making of laypeople, it turns out that professional decision-makers (judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and legislators) are also affected by the same cognitive limitations and biases. The difference is that their decision-making takes place within institutionally structured frameworks that themselves act as architectures of choice.
The article presents examples from criminal and civil law in which subtle features of the decision-making environment significantly affect outcomes, and analyzes the dual role of some lawyers who are both decision-makers and architects of choice. Special attention is paid to the question of ethics: is guiding professional decision-makers less controversial than influencing laypeople, and under what conditions is it legitimate?
The article concludes with the thesis that architecture of choice is not only a problem, but also part of the solution, if it is informed, transparent, and consciously designed in accordance with the values of the legal system.
Full article
Full article in available here: Arhitektura pravnega odločanja
